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Siemens Industry Software Pte Ltd v Lion Global 
Offshore Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 251: Further 
Issues in Contractual Formation and Duress  
 
For a second time in a month, the High Court decision of Siemens Industry 
Software Pte Ltd v Lion Global Offshore Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 251 (“Siemens 
Industry Software”) gives us valuable guidance on the application of trite 
principles of contractual formation to a practical fact pattern. The case also 
discussed whether enforcing one’s legal right can ever amount to duress.  
 
Siemens Industry Software was the appeal by the defendant, Lion Global 
Offshore Pte Ltd, against the Assistant Registrar’s decision to enter summary 
judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Siemens Industry Software Pte Ltd. Owing 
to a copyright dispute over the use of the plaintiff’s software by the defendant, 
the parties entered into a settlement arrangement. This arrangement 
essentially involved a full and final settlement of the copyright dispute on a no-
fault basis, conditional upon the defendant paying $267,500 (including taxes) 
under a licensed software designation agreement (“LSDA”) for six software 
licences. Accordingly, two documents were concluded: a settlement agreement 
(“SA”), and the LSDA. When the defendant refused to pay the $267,500, the 
plaintiff considered that refusal to be a repudiatory breach of the LSDA. The 
plaintiff thereafter elected to continue with the LSDA and delivered six software 
licences to the defendant. It then issued a letter of demand to the defendant for 
the $267,500. When the defendant still refused to pay, the plaintiff commenced 
the present action for summary judgment in its favour.  
 
The defendant argued on appeal that it should be given leave to defend, as there 
were several triable issues.  
 
Contractual formation issue (1): Whether the LSDA was dependent 
on the SA 
 
First, whether the plaintiff was precluded from proceeding with its claim based 
only on the LSDA; essentially, the defendant’s argument was that since the SA 
was made conditional upon the completion of the LSDA, the SA needed to be 
considered as well. Put another way: was the LSDA alone sufficient to establish 
an agreement between the parties? 
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Whether this was a triable issue requires the consideration of basic contractual 
formation principles. As was discussed in a recent entry on this blog, the Court 
of Appeal held in R1 International Pte Ltd v Lonstroff AG[2014] SGCA 56 that 
the law adopts an objective approach towards ascertaining contractual 
formation. Thus, whether a contract is formed (and its constituent terms) 
depend not on the parties’ subjective assertions, but on how a reasonable 
person would understand the situation. It is important to emphasise the correct 
perspective from the reasonable person is to understand what the parties 
intended. One approach is to consider what a reasonable person in the place of 
the promisee might have understood the promisor to mean; thus, “[w]ords are 
to be interpreted as they were reasonably understood by the man to whom they 
were spoken, not as they were understood by the man who spoke them”; this is 
the “promisee objectivity” approach. It is clear that the promisee objectivity 
approach applies in Singapore. As Yong Pung How CJ said in Tribune 
Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 3 SLR 405: 
 
The principles of law relating to the formation of contracts are 
clear. Indeed the task of inferring an assent and of extracting the 
precise moment, if at all there was one, at which a meeting of the 
minds between the parties may be said to have been reached is 
one of obvious difficulty, particularly in a case where there has 
been protracted negotiations and a considerable exchange of 
written correspondence between the parties. Nevertheless, the 
function of the court is to try as far as practical experience allows, 
to ensure that the reasonable expectations of honest men are not 
disappointed. To this end, it is also trite law that the test of 
agreement or of inferring consensus ad idem is objective. Thus, 
the language used by one party, whatever his real intention may 
be, is to be construed in the sense in which it would be reasonably 
understood by the other. [emphasis added] 
 
Although not expressly stated by the court in Siemens Industry Software, it is 
clear that it applied these principles. It held that, objectively considered, the SA 
being conditional on the sale of the six software licences pursuant to the LSDA 
did not mean that the LSDA was conditional on the SA. The defendant’s own 
subjective assertions on a contrary effect of the SA and the LSDA was irrelevant; 
in any case, the evidence contradicted this assertion as the defendant had stated 
in an email that it understood that an agreement had been concluded. As such, 
there was no need for the plaintiff to plead the SA, and this first alleged triable 
issue was not in fact one.  
 
Contractual formation issue (2): Whether the LSDA was sufficiently 
complete and certain  
 
The second alleged triable issue actually consisted related issues, but they all 
had to do with whether the LSDA was sufficiently complete and certain to be 
enforceable. The defendant argued that the LSDA could not be enforced as 
there was, first, no agreed terms for payment, and secondly, vagueness relating 
to the words “valid through: June 30, 2014”. 
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The court first found that uncertainty as to the time of payment may render an 
agreement unenforceable when it is determined to be vital to the agreement. 
Indeed, such was the case in T2 Networks Pte Ltd v Nasioncom Sdn 
Bhd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 1 (“T2 Networks”), where the High Court found that a 
settlement agreement was not legally binding because the payment terms were 
not certain. However, in Siemens Industry Software, the court found that there 
was no evidence that time of payment was vital to the transaction. Thus, the 
court appeared to have accepted that there was indeed an uncertainty as to the 
time of payment. However, this did not render the contract unenforceable 
because the time of payment terms were not vital to the transaction. Indeed, 
the court further went on to say that there was no basis to imply a term 
providing for payment within a reasonable time, therefore fortifying the earlier 
suggestion that the court did, in fact, regard the time of payment terms to be 
uncertain. As such, the court did not consider this to be a triable issue. 
 
With respect, it may be unclear why time of payment is not vital in the present 
case. Similar to T2 Networks,Siemens Industry Software concerned a 
settlement agreement; it ought to a valid consideration to all parties when the 
settlement is to be effected. Indeed, contrary to the court’s conclusion that time 
of payment was a minor term compared to the quantity of products to be 
purchased, the method of delivery and the price of sale, it is respectfully 
submitted that without agreement of the time of payment, the LSDA would be 
an essentially “empty” agreement that does not have a time of performance 
stipulated on the part of the defendant. Furthermore, given that the SA is 
dependent on the completion of the LSDA, surely when the LSDA was in fact 
completed, itself dependent on the time of payment, must be considered vital 
by the parties.  
 
However, the court was, with respect, correct that the words “valid through: 
June 30, 2014” simply meant that the LSDA was open for acceptance until that 
date. This therefore did not render the LSDA uncertain and unenforceable, and 
did not give rise to a triable issue. 
 
Duress: Whether the LSDA was procured by duress 
 
Although the court in Siemens Industry Software need not have considered 
duress because it was not pleaded by the defendant but only raised orally at the 
appeal, the court nonetheless considered it for completeness. According to the 
defendant, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s representative acted in a 
threatening manner when the parties met to resolve the copyright dispute. The 
defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s representative stated that copyright 
infringement was a serious offence that could land the defendant’s 
representatives in jail, and that the plaintiff could sue the defendant for 
damages of over US$800,000. 
 
The court rightly found that even if the plaintiff’s representative had threatened 
legal action against the defendant and its representatives, this did not amount 
to duress since a threat to enforce one’s legal right does not generally amount 
to duress. There was therefore no triable issue as to whether the LSDA was 
procured by duress. 
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Indeed, generally speaking, a threat of a lawful action – that is, actions which 
the person making the threat is legally entitled to do – coupled with a 
reasonable demand does not amount to illegitimate pressure. Thus, in Lee 
Kuan Yew v Chee Soon Juan [2003] 3 SLR(R) 8, Rubin J held that even if the 
plaintiff had threatened to commence legal proceedings against the defendant, 
“such a threat did not amount in law to duress”.  Similarly, the High Court more 
recently in Real Estate Consortium Pte Ltd v East Coast Properties Pte 
Ltd[2010] SGHC 373 reiterated the view that the threat of legal action to 
enforce one’s legal right (in that case, taking legal action to enforce payment of 
a sum agreed) is not a wrongful threat. The proposition that threat of a lawful 
action does not amount to illegitimate pressure is the view generally espoused 
in the case law, a prominent illustration of which is the English Court of Appeal 
decision of CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714. 
 
However, the proposition that a threat to enforce one’s legal right does not 
amount to duress is only true if the threat is made bone fide, and is not 
manifestly frivolous or vexatious. In Lee Kuan Yew v Chee Soon Juan, Rubin J 
appeared to agree with counsel’s argument that a threat to enforce one’s legal 
rights by way of legal proceedings could constitute duress if “it was used as an 
instrument to extort money from others”. This suggests that there could be a 
point (especially in egregious cases) when the threat of a lawful act could 
nevertheless constitute duress.  
 
Where that point might lie was not considered in Siemens Industry Software, 
presumably because the court did not regard the plaintiff’s threat to be 
made mala fides. Indeed, the court placed some emphasis on the fact that the 
plaintiff’s threat was not without basis since the defendant had admitted 
beforehand that there had been unauthorised installations and use of the 
plaintiff’s software. Moreover, the sum of US$800,000 mentioned in the 
plaintiff’s threat was also arrived at a pricing mechanism that was disclosed to 
the defendant before the parties met.  
 
Although the court in Siemens Industry Software did not consider explicitly 
the point at which a threat to enforce one’s legal right might amount to duress, 
its findings, considered in light of other Singapore cases (see, eg, Tam Tak 
Chuen v Khairul bin Abdul Rahman [2009] 2 SLR(R) 240), make it clear that 
the local courts have adopted the four general factors identified by Professor 
Enonchong in ascertaining when duress might be found in such a situation. 
These four factors are: 
 
(a) The threat involves an abuse of the legal process. 
 
(b) The demand is not made bona fide. 
 
(c) The demand is unreasonable. 
 
(d) The threat is considered unconscionable in the circumstances. 
 
Quite clearly, the court in Siemens Industry Software considered that the 
plaintiff’s threat was made bona fides as it was not without basis. In a related 
vein, the threat was not unreasonable. However, notwithstanding the 
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Singapore courts’ general acceptance of Professor Enonchong’s four factors, it 
might be useful to take note of the High Court’s warning in E C Investment 
Holding Pte Ltd v Ridout Residence Pte Ltd[2011] 2 SLR 232 (“E C Investment 
Holding”) about Professor Enonchong’s proposal that a lawful threat could 
amount to duress if the terms secured “are so ‘manifestly disadvantageous’ as 
to make itunconscionable for the defendant to retain the benefit of it”. The 
court in E C Investment Holding warned that this proposal should not be 
adopted “without a degree of caution” as this might come too close to re-writing 
disadvantageous contracts. 
 
 
Goh Yihan (Associate Professor, Singapore Management University) 
 
 
* This blog entry may be cited as Goh Yihan, "Siemens Industry Software Pte Ltd v 
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